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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper develops a model of the costliness of inflation that places the locus of costs in 
the bond market, rather than the money market. It argues that inflation is costly on 
account on the contraction of the bond market caused by the riskiness of inflation. The 
theory is premised upon the social function of bond markets as consisting of the 
transference of technological risk from those economic interests where risk is most 
concentrated (and so most painful) to interests where it is less concentrated (and so less 
painful). Using a Ramsey-Solow model with decision-makers maximising expected 
utility from consumption and real balances, the paper argues that unpredictable inflation 
impedes this useful transfer in risks secured by the bond market. Unpredictable inflation 
makes debt most costly when income is the most needed by debtors (since when the ex 
post real interest is highest, the debtor is in consequence the poorest), and credit the most 
remunerative when income is the least needed by creditors (since when the ex post real 
interest is the highest, the creditor is as a consequence richest). The upshot of these 
disincentives to borrow and lend is that less risk is transferred. Thus unpredictable 
inflation reduces the socially beneficial transfer of risks that a bond market secures. 
 
 
JEL codes:  E31 E43 E61 
 
Keywords: inflation cost, inflation risk, debt,  
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Many costs of inflation have been identified by economic theorists (see Dowd 1994 
for a survey). This paper supplies another. 
 
This paper (drawn from Coleman 2007) presents a theory of the cost of inflation that 
turns on the contraction of the bond market caused by the riskiness of inflation, and 
the reduction in the socially beneficial transfer of risk between economic interests that 
results. 
  
The analysis rests critically on a certain property of Ramsey-Solow style model: that 
in such a model bond markets transfer technological risk from those factors of 
production where risk weighs heaviest (and so is most painful) to factors where risk 
weighs less heavily (and so is less painful), and thereby produce a social gain. To 
illustrate: if we suppose that capital-owners are more vulnerable to technological risk 
than workers, then debt allows workers to borrow from capital-owners and so 
purchase capital, and capital-owners to disburden themselves of capital and shift into 
bonds. This trade in risky capital secured by bond markets allows capitalists to hedge, 
and workers to speculate, to the mutual benefit of both. Capitalists reduce the risk on 
capital: workers get the premium of capital. 
 
However, the successful transfer of technological risk by bond markets in a Ramsey-
Solow type model does suppose that bonds are ‘real’ (ie inflation indexed). But real 
bonds are a marginal and atypical feature of the real world. We are left to ask, ‘What 
if all borrowing and lending was conducted through money loans?’ How successfully 
would risk be transferred if real bonds did not exist?  
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The paper demonstrates that if all borrowing and lending is conducted through money 
loans then the useful trade in risks is impeded by unpredictable inflation, on account 
of the disincentives that unpredictability creates for both borrowers and lenders.  For 
capital-owners, lending to workers to finance worker’s purchase of capital does not 
now reduce the capitalists ‘total risk’ as much as it did before, because the capitalist 
lender is now exposed to being injured by episodes of unexpectedly high inflation. At 
the same time, borrowing now increases the workers total risk more than it did before, 
because worker debtors are now exposed to being injured by episodes of unexpectedly 
low inflation.1 This upshot is that less risk is traded. Less risk is transferred from 
where it is most painful to where it is least painful. Here lies a cost of inflation. 
 
The paper begins by explicating the role of real bond markets in the welfare efficient 
management of technology shocks. It then assesses the performance of that role when 
bonds are nominal, not real.  It concludes that risky inflation makes the effectiveness of 
the performance of that role by nominal bonds less than complete, and the 
incompleteness of that role is the cost of inflation. The paper then registers some 
qualifications and limitations to this claim, before co-ordinating its conclusions with 
other theories of costliness; outlining the congruence of the paper’s analysis with some 
earlier understanding of the cost of inflation, and its incongruence with some other 
conceptions. The paper ends with an essay in the quantification  
 
                                                 
1 Debtors also face the welcome ‘risk’ of unexpectedly high inflation. But the upsides and 
downsides of inflation are asymmetrical in impact, owing to the different marginal utilities 
associated with high and low inflation outcomes. For debtors, the nasty thing about inflation 
risk is that it makes debt most costly when income is the most needed by debtors; for when 
the ex post real interest is highest, the debtor is (as a consequence) the poorest. Similarly for 
creditors, inflation risk means credit is the most remunerative when income is the least needed 
by creditors; for when the ex post real interest is highest, the creditor is (as a consequence) the 
richest. 
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The redundancy of debt in the absence of risk. 
 
In the standard interpretation, the pre-eminent social function of debt is to relocate 
consumption across time. In a phrase, ‘consumption smoothing’. The present analysis 
contends that the social function of debt is not to smooth consumption; it is not to 
relocate consumption over time. The social function of debt is, instead, to deal with risk. 
It transfers risk from those more risk vulnerable, and to those less risk vulnerable, so that 
the exposure to risk is equalised across all members of society. This process might be 
called ‘risk evening’. 
 
The paper’s argument for these contentions consists in drawing a contrast between the 
redundancy of debt under a perfect foresight Ramsey-Solow model, with the usefulness 
of debt under risk. This section, therefore, demonstrates that in a standard work-horse of 
economic analysis - a Ramsey-Solow growth model  – debt is functionless the absence 
of risk.  
 
Consider the familiar Ramsey-Solow with the standard array of assumptions: identical 
homothetic preferences; an exogenous labour supply; a two-factor, constant returns to 
scale production function; perfectly competitive factor and product markets; and general 
equilibrium.  In the absence of risk, the model’s foundations may be characterised by 
this suite of equations, 
 
 ...
]1[
1 +++= δαα
αα CCU   Y = C + I K1 = K + I   )LL
Ky(  =  Y    
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The critical optimisation condition of decision-makers arises from the trade-off 
between consumption and capital, and implies a linkage between  current marginal 
utility, future marginal utility, and the rate of profit, ρ, 
 
    1[1 ]C CU Uρ= +   capital 
 
 where   1
1
Y
K
ρ ∂= ∂  
 
Thus the explanation of the rate of profit is the familiar Fisherian one of the 
reconciliation of time preference and the marginal productivity of capital.  
 
A theory of the rate of interest is easily constructed. Suppose there exists a one period 
bond that pays a contractual real rate of interest, r. The optimisation condition 
involving the trade-off between consumption and bonds would be, 
     
     1[1 ]C CU r U= +     
 
A comparison of the optimisation conditions allows us to infer, 
 
     ρ=r      
Thus the rate of interest equals the rate of profit, which is, in turn, a matter of time 
preference and productivity of capital. 
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But the key point is that there is no theory of debt in the riskless Ramsey-Solow 
model. The model provides no reason as to why anyone would wish own, or owe, 
debt. To press the point: what is the quantity of debt in the model? The quantity is 
completely indeterminate. It is indeterminate since bonds have no function, either 
socially or privately. There is no benefit to individuals in buying or selling them; 
anything a bond can do, capital can do just as well. Do you wish to transfer 
consumption into the future? Buy capital today. Do you wish to transfer consumption 
from the future to the present? Sell capital today. (And if you do not have any: short 
sell it).2 Debt is not required for intertemporal trade in consumption. Bonds are a fifth 
wheel. 
 
Neither does debt confer any benefit to ‘society as whole’; the system is welfare 
efficient without it. The welfare efficiency is established from the equality of all 
persons marginal rate of intertemporal substitution with the marginal rate of 
intertemporal transformation, which may be obtained from the first order conditions 
for capital, without any reference to debt markets.  
 
The upshot is that most extreme anti-usury laws would not have the smallest 
significance for the welfare efficiency of the model economy. If such laws completely 
wiped out any debt that might exist, the economy remains pareto-efficient.  
 
                                                 
2 Is there any difference between short-selling capital and selling a bond? There seems no 
operational difference in a riskless world. But we take this to say that in a riskless world 
short-selling capital can do the job of bonds. 
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Risk as the basis of debt 
 
Debt acquires a usefulness in the presence of riskiness in technology.3 We show that 
they, in certain circumstances, provide perfect insurance against profit risk caused by 
technology shocks. 
 
To introduce the argument we note that technological change can be represented by 
labour augmenting and capital augmenting parameters; 
  
    L )
L
Ky(  =  Y λλ
κ      
 
To allow for riskiness in technology we suppose now that the state of technology in 
period 1 is not known but is a random variable; it changes unpredictably. So for any state 
of the world, s 
 
   1 1 1
1 1 1 1
s s s
s s
Y K                =  y( )                      
L L
κ
λ λ    
 
There is, correspondingly, an ex post rate of profit, s ρ, for each state s. 
 
 
    
. .
1 1 1
1 1 1
'
s
s s s
s
Y K y ( ) 
K L
κρ κ κλ
∂= + = +∂     
 
                                                 
3 All risk is technological risk. We assume bonds have no credit-risk. 
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This risk in technology does not alter the national income identities, and capital growth 
equations. But the equimarginal conditions are changed. Assuming that decision-makers 
know the probabilities of the states of the world, and maximise expected utility the 
equimarginal condition that matches the cost of acquiring capital (in terms of current 
consumption sacrifice) to the benefit (in terms of future consumption gain) is now , 
 
   1[[1 ] ]C CU E Uρ= +   Capital   
    1[1 ]C CU r EU= +    Bonds   
 
Critically, the equimarginal condition for bonds that does not merely ‘repeat’ that for 
capital. This, we contend, is a signal of the functionality that bonds have acquired 
under risk. To argue that contention we will solve the model. 
 
The Two Group: Two State: Two Period Model 
 
We first present a solution in terms of a further simplified model. We suppose there 
are just two periods; Period 0 and Period 1.  
 
We also suppose there are just two possible states of the world in Period 1: State 0 
and State 1. State 1 is the high output state of the world, and State 0 is the low output 
state of the world. We also assume, for the time being, that the high output state is 
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also the high profit rate state, and the low output state is also the lower profit rate 
state. (This assumption can be relaxed).The probability of State 0 is p. 
 
We additionally suppose that there are two groups or ‘classes’ that make up the 
population, F and G. The two groups are completely homogeneous in composition, 
but differ from each other in their relative factor endowments. Group F has a 
relatively high amount of capital, and group G has a low amount of capital. The two 
groups have identical preferences. 
 
Finally, we suppose, for the moment, that saving of the two groups in period 0 is 
exogenous. Consequently, the magnitude of the stock of capital in period 1 is 
exogenous. Further total saving in period 1 simply equals the negative of the capital 
stock, as there is no wish to have capital in period 2. Thus the consumption 
endowment of each group in period 1 equals their income from the factors they own, 
plus their endowment of capital.  
 
The consumption endowment can be represented in an Edgeworth Box Diagram. 
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Figure 1: Social and private endowments in a two state model of risk 
0
1
FC = consumption of F in state of the world 1 in period 1 etc 
 
As F and G are expected utility maximisers, it helps to plot on the Box the ‘expected 
utility indifference curves’. The expected utility curves of F have a slope of p/[1-p] at 
the 45 degree ray from the south-west origin.4  
                                                 
4 Given 0 11 1( ) [1 ] ( )
F F FEU pU C p U C= + −  then 0 0 11 1' [1 ] 'F F FdEU p U d C p U dC= + − . 
As 0 1' 'U U= along the 45 degree ray, if 0FdEU =  along the 45 degree ray then 
E 
 
 
0CG1 
 
0CF1 
1CF1 
1CG1 
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It also proves helpful to plot on the Box ‘iso expected consumption’ loci, each locus 
indicating the combinations of State 1 consumption and State 0 consumption which 
yield a certain level of expected consumption. These ‘iso expected consumption’ have 
a slope of p/[1-p ].5 Thus the expected utility indifference curves and ‘iso expected 
consumption curves’ are tangential at the 45 degree line. 
                                                                                                                                            
0
1 1
[1 ]F Fpd C dC
p
−= − . 
5 Given 0 11 1 1[1 ]
F F FEC p C p C= + −  then 0 11 1 1[1 ]F F FdEC pd C p d C= + − .If 1 0FdEC =  
then 0 11 1
[1 ]F Fpd C d C
p
−= − . 
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Figure 2: Preferences and expected consumption in a two state model of risk 
 
G’s expected utility indifference curves can also be plotted on the Edgeworth box. 
The expected utility curves of G have a slope of p/[1-p] at the 45 degree ray from the 
north-east origin. 
 
Plainly, most distributions of consumption between the F and G are pareto inefficient. 
 
Iso-expected 
consumption 
Iso-expected 
utility 
 
45 degrees 
0CF1 
1CF1 
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Figure 3: Most consumption points are pareto inefficient 
 
But it is also plain that there exist efficient distributions, that are located at the 
tangency of the indifference curves of F and G. This equality of the slopes of the 
indifference curves may be written, 
 
     
     
0 0
1 1
F G
F G
υ υ
υ υ=      
 
 
1CF1 
0CG1 
1CG1 
0CF1 
45 degrees 
45 degrees 
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where 
     1
1
s j
S j
j
Uc
EUc
υ ≡      
 
 
This condition allows a description of efficient consumption: an efficient distribution 
of consumption requires that the F’s marginal utility in the ‘up’ state relative to F’s 
marginal utility in the ‘down’ state (each normalised by the expectation of F’s 
marginal utility) must equal G’s marginal utility in the ‘up’ state relative to G’s 
marginal utility in the ‘down’ state (each normalised by the expectation of G’s 
marginal utility).  
 
 
Since the marginal utility of consumption depends on the level of consumption, this 
requirement of welfare efficiency must imply some sort of relation between F’s 
consumption in the up state, relative to the down state, with G’s consumption in the 
up state, relative to the down state. If we assume homogeneous and identical 
preferences the implied relation is, 
 
    
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
F G
F G
C C C
EC EC EC
= =  
or 
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
F G
F G
C C C
C C C
= =     6 
                                                 
6 Proof: 
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The obvious diagrammatic corollary of the efficient management of risk is that 
efficient points lie upon the diagonal of the Box. 
 
Figure 4: The locus of efficient distributions in consumption 
                                                                                                                                            
  
1
1
[ ]
[ ]
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s F
s s F
C
p C
α
αυ
−
−= ∑  
 
 
If 
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
F G
F G
C C C
C C C
= =  then 
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=
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C C
EC EC
=
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Thus under identical and homothetic preferences, efficient management of social risk 
means that if society’s consumption is x percent higher in the favourable state 
compared to the unfavourable state, then every individual’s consumption is x percent 
higher in the favourable state compared to the unfavourable state. All boats must rise 
and fall with the tide, equally. That is the welfare efficient way of dealing with risk 
under identical and homothetic preferences. 
 
We are now led to the question: What is the relation between the efficient allocation 
of consumption and the market allocation of consumption?  
 
The analysis implies that the market for real bonds will, with some exceptions noted 
below, secure this welfare efficient allocation. The critical observation to sustain this 
contention is that F can shift their consumption point from their endowment point by 
selling bonds in period 0 in order to buy capital in period 0. If bonds are not to 
dominate capital, or visa versa, it must be that 1ρ > r > 0ρ. This implies that F’s 
purchase of bonds, financed by the sale of equal value of capital, will reduce F’s 
consumption by 1ρ−r in state of the world 1, and increase F’s by r-0ρ in state of the 
world zero. In other words, F’s consumption point is sent ‘south east’ by F’s purchase 
of bonds. Greater purchases of bonds by F will send F’s consumption further ‘south-
east’ along a line with a slope in absolute terms of
1
0
r
r
ρ
ρ
−
−   
 
Conversely, F’s purchase of capital, financed by the sale of bonds, will shift the F’s 
consumption point ‘north west’. 
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Figure 5: The consumption point is shifted by the exchange of bonds and capital  
 
In the same way, G can shift themselves along the same frontier by either buying 
capital and selling bonds, or, selling capital and buying bonds. 
 
The Box Diagram shows the general equilibrium, where F wants to buy the same 
number of bonds that G wants to sell. 
E 
F Selling K, 
F Buying B 
F  Buying K, 
F Selling B 
0CF1 
1CF1 
Efficiency 
locus 
45 degrees 
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Figure 6: Equilibrium 
At the maximizing point for, both G and F, the slope of the frontier  
1
0
r
r
ρ
ρ
−
− equals the 
slope of the iso-utility frontier, 
0
1
1
1[1 ]
p Uc
p Uc− .  
 
Evidently, F and G at the equilibrium point are on a higher level of expected utility 
than at the autarkic point E. There are social gains from trading bonds for capital. 
How can we understand these gains? Essentially, those burdened with risk have paid 
others to relieve them part of their risk. By moving south-east of their endowment, F 
E
C
1CF1 
1CG1 
0CG1 
0CF1 
efficiency 
locus 
45 degrees 
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has reduced their expected consumption; but, in approaching the 45 degree line, F has 
increased the security of their consumption. F in this situation is a ‘hedger’. At the 
same time, G, by shifting their consumption ‘south-east’ of their endowment; 
increases their expected consumption, but, by withdrawing further from their 45 
degree line, reduces the security of their consumption. Group G are speculators. 
 
 
Figure 7: Hedging and Speculating 
 
 
E
C 
1CF1 
1CG1 
0CG1 
0CF1 
Efficiency 
locus 
Budget 
constraint 
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In the general equilibrium, one group will be Hedgers and the other Speculators: one 
group will be increasing their expected income at the cost to its security, and the other 
will be reducing their expected income, but to the benefit of their security. Hedgers 
pay Speculators to assume part of their risk.  
 
The social function of debt is established. Real debt allows the relatively risk 
insulated to supply ‘insurance’ to the relatively risk exposed over unpredictable 
fluctuations in factor prices.  
 
Debt provides an exchange of risk and expected consumption that is mutually 
improving. It gives consumption security to those who are consumption vulnerable, 
and consumption expansion to the (relatively) consumption invulnerable. It drives the 
variance of consumption of the two groups to equality. It shares out the risk between 
the two groups.  
 
Hedgers and Speculators/Workers and Capitalists  
 
We have analysed debt as a trade between those whose consumption endowments 
more risk vulnerable, and those less risk vulnerable. The more risk vulnerable 
experience disproportionately high incomes during the up, and disproportionately low 
incomes during the down. They become hedgers. Those less risk vulnerable 
experience income increases less than proportionate during the up, and decreases less 
than proportionate during the down. They become ‘speculators’.  
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Can we relate the categories of Hedger and Speculator to other economic categories in 
the analysis? To the distribution of endowments of labour and capital? To the relative 
importance of labour augmenting and capital augmenting change? To the elasticity of 
technical substitution? With the help of these, can we identify ‘who’, and ‘under what 
conditions’ will be the Hedgers, and ‘who’, and ‘under what conditions’, will be the 
speculators? No. No sweeping simplicities govern the identification of Hedger and 
Speculator to with economic interest. 
 
The identification of hedgers and speculators with the economies various economic 
interests cannot be secured with any confidence theoretically, but only empirically 
(see Coleman 2007 pp124-7 for a closer examination of this question). Experience 
teaches that the profit bill is more unstable over the business cycle than the wage bill: 
we will therefore henceforth assume that the interest with the higher capital/labour 
ratio, F, is the hedger. 
 
A ‘three state’ exposition. 
Is the analysis of the previous section simply a ‘wonder’ of its two state assumption? 
We do not think so. Diagrammatically it can be extended to the three state case.  
 
Suppose there remain two interests, F and G, but there are now three states of the 
world; 0, 1 and 2. State 0 is ‘low profit, low output’; State 1 is ‘high profit, high 
output’; and State 2 is ‘very high profit, very high output’. As before,  F owns a large 
amount of capital relative  to G, so its endowment rises relative to G in States 1 and 2. 
 
The social, and their distribution, can be represented in an Edgeworth ‘Cube’. 
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Figure 8: Endowments in a three state world. 
 
The welfare efficient locus of consumption can be represented by a diagonal 
extending from the hindmost ‘South West’ corner to the foremost ‘North East’ corner. 
Evidently, the Endowment point, E, will (flukes aside) not lie on that diagonal, and 
not be welfare efficient.  
 
An efficient consumption point can, nevertheless, be reached by means of F’s sale of 
capital to G, and purchase of bonds from G. The magnitude of the real rate of interest 
on these bonds can be chosen so that it is lower than the rate of profit in state 1 and 2, 
but higher than the profit rate in state 0. Given this, every such capital-for bonds swap 
E
the efficient locus 
the endowment point
0CF1 
1CF1 
2CF1 
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reduces F’s consumption in states 1 and 2, but increases it in state 0. As can be seen 
from Figure 9, this drives the actual consumption point from E and towards the 
diagonal. A sufficiently large capital-for bonds swap will drive the consumption point 
to the diagonal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Efficient consumption  in a three state world. 
 
E
the efficient locus 
the consumption point 
the endowment point
0CF1 
1CF1 
2CF1 
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A supply and demand exposition of the transfer of risk 
by bond markets. 
 
The Edgeworth Box is a useful tool for introducing the topic, but even in three  
dimensions it is too special. A supply and demand treatment has a superior generality. 
 
The demand schedule and the supply schedule for bonds may be derived from the 
equimarginal conditions, 
 
   1[ [1 ]]
j jUc E Uc ρ= +   Capital 
 
    1[1 ]
j jUc r EUc= +   Real Bonds 
 
 
Substituting, 
    1 1[[1 ] ] [1 ]
j jE Uc r EUcρ+ = +      
       
Or, 
 cov( , )
jE rρ ρ υ− = −      
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where 
    1
1
j
j
j
Uc
EUc
υ ≡       
 
 
This equality is an example the familiar risk premium type expression in finance: the 
excess of the expected return on capital over bonds is the negative of the covariance 
of the profit rate with the normalised marginal utility of consumption.  
 
It will prove convenient to define, 
 
    cov( , )
j j
ρω ρ υ≡ −      
and rewrite the condition as, 
    
jE r ρρ ω− =       
j
ρω , evidently, is a risk premium. It is the excess return over bonds that j must receive 
on their capital if they are not to prefer bonds to capital. 
 
The LHS of this equality may be considered the ‘price’ of bonds; it equals the 
expected  opportunity cost of owning bonds. The RHS is a magnitude that will change 
with the amount of bonds owned, or owed. 
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To advance the construction of demand and supply schedules, we again think in terms 
of two groups, F and G; two groups; one with a higher endowment of capital relative 
to labour, F; and one with a lower endowment of capital to labour, G.  
 
 
 
FE r ρρ ω− =        
    
GE r ρρ ω− =        
 
At B = 0 the magnitudes of Fρω  and Gρω  are determined by the co-movement of each 
groups consumption endowment with the profit rate. The group with the more 
positive capital/labour ratio, F, will have the more negative co-movement in marginal 
utility with profit, and so a more positive jρω . The group with the more smaller 
capital/labour ratio, G, will have a less negative co-movement in marginal utility with 
profit, and so a smaller positive jρω  (and possibly even a negative one). We can plot  
F
ρω and Gρω  as the vertical axis intercepts of a figure that plots E rρ − on the vertical 
axis, and bond issues on the horizontal axis.  
 
As F’s ownership of bonds becomes positive, the magnitude of Fρω  falls, by the logic 
explained earlier by means of the Box: the bond holder, as ‘hedger’, is reducing the 
comovement of their consumption opportunity with the profit rate. We are tracing out 
a ‘downward’ sloping demand curve for bonds with respect to the risk premium. 
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Figure 10: The demand curve for bonds 
 
As G owes positive rather than zero, the magnitude of Gρω  rises, also by the logic 
explained earlier: the bond seller, as ‘speculator’, is increasing the comovement of 
consumption with the profit rate. We are tracing out a ‘upward’ sloping supply curve 
for bonds with respect to the risk premium. 
Eρ-r 
B 
demand 
for bonds 
F
ρω at 
B=0 
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Figure 11: The supply curve of bonds 
 
It is easy to persuade oneself that at the point where the demand curve for bonds 
intersects the supply curve for bonds, the negative of the covariance of the profit rate 
with the marginal utility of the two groups are the same.  
 
    Fρω  = Gρω       
 
But this is a signal of the efficient distribution of consumption. For this equality is 
satisfied if, 
 
    F Gυ υ=  in all states of the world.  
           
which, in the two state, case implies 
Eρ-r 
B 
supply 
of bonds 
G
ρω at B=0 
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0 0
1 1
F G
F G
υ υ
υ υ=       
 
But we have already concluded, from the Box analysis, that this is condition welfare 
efficiency in the two state case, and a property of the market equilibrium. 
 
The welfare efficiency of the market equilibrium is underlined by the fact that the 
intersection of the two schedules is interpretable as the quantity of debt that 
maximises the sum of ‘creditors’ surplus’ and ‘debtors’ surplus’. Consider,  
 
  j’s marginal expected utility of a unit of capital  
  1[[1 ] ]
jE Ucρ= +  = 1 1[1 ] cov( , )j jE EUc Ucρ ρ+ +  
and 
  j’s marginal expected utility of a unit of bonds  
  1[1 ]
jr EUc= +  
Then 
 
marginal expected utility of a purchase of bonds by way of a sale of capital 
  
= 1 1 1[1 ] [[1 ] ] cov( , )
j j jr E Uc E EUc Ucρ ρ+ − + −  
 
= 1[ cov( , )]
j
jr E EUcρ ρ υ− −        
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Thus current consumption equivalent of a purchase of bonds by way of a sale of 
capital is 1[ [ ]]
1
j E r
rρ
ω ρ− − +  
7. For any exchange of bonds for capital ‘on the 
margin’, the magnitude of this expression is obviously zero, since in equilibrium 
jE r ρρ ω− = . But for any infra marginal exchange the magnitude is positive, and 
equals the excess of jρω  over rE −ρ , that equals the distance between the demand 
curve, and the ‘price of bonds, rE −ρ .  
 
Another way of looking at it, is that the creditor in buying bonds loses an amount 
equal to B[Eρ –r], but unburdens, on the debtor, a ‘value’ of risk equal to aa bb cc dd. 
The creditor’s surplus in Figure 12 is the triangle aa bb ee. 
                                                 
7 Thus current consumption equivalent of a purchase of bonds by way of a sale of capital is = 
 1[ cov( , )]
j
j
j
EUcr E
Uc
ρ ρ υ− −  7 
= 
1[ [ ] cov( , )]
1j
E r
r
ρ ρ υ− − − +  
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Figure 12: The ‘surplus’ of creditors  
 
By a parallel logic the surplus of debtors is represented in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  The ‘surplus’ of debtors 
Net benefit of debtors 
Eρ-r 
aa 
bb 
cc 
B 
Net benefit of creditors 
B[ρ−r] 
B 
Eρ - r 
aa 
bb 
cc dd 
ee 
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For borrowers, they receive a net income equal to B[ρ-r], but they pay a risk expense 
equal to the sum of inframarginal magnitudes of Gρω . 
 
The implications of a missing real bond market for the evening of 
risk 
 
Suppose now there are no real bonds. 
 
The implications of a missing real bond market for the transfer of risk can be brought out 
by recapitulating the optimisation conditions, 
 
  ]]1[[ 1 ρ+= UcEUc   Capital     
  ( 1[1 ]Uc r EUc= +   Real Bonds)    
  1
1[ ]
1
iUc E Uc π
+= +   Money Bonds    
 
If real bonds are present then, we may from infer from the capital and real bonds 
conditions, 
 
    jE r ρρ ω− =  
 
and so the magnitude of jρω  is the same for all j/ 
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As explained in this condition (with some exceptions) secures efficiency in 
consumption with respect to technical shocks. So, if real bonds are present the only 
role of money bonds is redundant. 
 
But if real bonds are absent then money bonds will assume the function of real bonds 
of transferring technological risk. But in place of the risk premium equality above, we 
infer from conditions for capital and money, 
 
   11 [ ]
1
j jiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+     
where cov( , )j jω ρ υ−Π ≡ − , and may be interpreted as the inflation risk premium on 
money bonds.8 
 
 
Given the uniformity of the LHS across j one may infer that the magnitude of 
j j
ρω ω−Π− is the same for all j. 
 
Clearly this equality does not insure jρω  is the same for all j. Indeed, as will be seen will 
j
ρω  generally be different for different j in the presence of risky inflation. This implies 
consumption is not shared out in the efficient manner. 
 
                                                 
8 Consider the case when capital is riskless. Then,  1[ ] [1 ]
1
j iEω ρπ−Π
+= − ++ . Then  
jω−Π  is the excess real return on money bonds that money bonds must receive if 
capital is not to be preferred to money bonds. 
 33
The impact of inflation risk on the bond market 
 
The impact inflation risk has on the demand and supply of bonds can be used to 
explicate the contention that inflation risk harms the efficient sharing of consumption  
 
Demand and supply schedules for bonds can be derived from the equality, 
 
   11 [ ]
1
j jiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+      
 
The LHS is the excess return capital is expected to earn over money bonds, and can 
be considered the price of money bonds. As both the terms on the RHS are a function 
of the quantity of money bonds, D, we can trace relations between the price of bonds 
and the quantity bonds.  
 
To facilitate demand and supply analysis we assume (as was done before) that the 
population falls into two groups; one with a higher endowment of capital relative to 
labour, F; and one with a lower endowment of capital to labour, G. The first group, 
with a high exposure to risk, are ‘hedger-capitalist-creditors’. The second are 
‘speculator-worker-debtors’. For each group there is an associated condition for the 
excess return on capital, 
 
   11 [ ]
1
F FiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+     
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   11 [ ]
1
G GiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+     
   
 
At D = 0 the magnitude of both Fω−Π  and Gω−Π  is zero, given our assumption that 
inflation is white noise. At D = 0 Fρω  and Gρω  are determined by the co-movement of 
each groups consumption endowment with the profit rate. As F has the more higher 
capital/labour ratio, F will have the more negative co-movement in marginal utility 
with profit, and so a more positive jρω  than G.  
 
 
   At D = 0, F Gρ ρω ω>  and 0F Gω ω−Π −Π= = .    
    
 
We can represent Fρω and Gρω  at D = 0 as the vertical axis intercepts of a figure that 
plots E rρ − on the vertical axis, and bond issues on the horizontal axis. These two 
intercepts may be interpreted as the demand price of money bonds when D = 0, and  
the supply price of bonds at D = 0, respectively. 
 
To trace out the demand curve, we note that as D becomes positive then 
F
ρω diminishes, by the process explained in an earlier section: risky capital is 
exchanged for (more) reliable bonds. But as D becomes positive there is also now a 
new, additional element in tracing out the demand curve; Fω−Π  assumes a non-zero 
magnitude as D becomes positive. Once D is positive then for F (a creditor), an above 
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average rate of growth in purchasing power must coincide with an above average 
consumption of F - simply because creditors are richest when the growth in 
purchasing power is highest. So an above average rate of growth in purchasing power 
must coincide with a below average marginal utility of creditors. Thus Fω−Π (≡-
cov( , )Fπ υ− ) becomes positive. And so the demand price for bonds is reduced. This 
reduction in the demand price for bonds can be understood as a manifestation of an 
undesirable property of money bonds in the circumstances we are analysing: for 
creditors money bonds give their best return when return is least ‘needed’ (that is, 
marginal utility is lowest). On account of this undesirable property the demand price 
for bonds falls.9 
 
As D becomes larger Fω−Π  becomes still more positive, as the largeness of D makes 
for a still stronger comovement of the growth of purchasing power and creditor 
consumption, and so demand price shifts down more. 
                                                 
9 Evidently, it has been implicitly assumed that the magnitude of Fρω  is unchanged by 
unpredictable inflation for any level of debt. This is reasonable. Unpredictable 
inflation will add noise to F’s consumption, but will not change the covariance of 
their consumption with the profit rate. 
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Figure 14: Inflation risk contracts the demand for bonds by capitalist hedgers 
 
The construction of the supply curve for bonds follows a parallel logic. As D becomes 
positive then Gρω  rises, by the process explained in earlier sections: risky capital is 
bought by the sale of relatively reliable bonds. But as D becomes positive there is also 
now a new, additional element in tracing out the supply curves. Gω−Π  assumes a 
negative magnitude as D becomes positive. This is because for G (debtors), an above 
average growth rate in purchasing power must coincide with below average 
consumption - simply because debtors are poorest when the growth rate in purchasing 
power is highest. So an average rate of growth in purchasing power must coincide 
with an above average marginal utility of debtors. Thus Gω−Π (≡- cov( , )Gπ υ− ) becomes 
negative. The ‘supply price’ of bonds is increased. This rise in the supply price for 
bonds can be understood as a manifestation of an undesirable property of money 
bonds in these circumstances: they are most costly to debtors when debtors are most 
in ‘need’ of income (when the marginal utility of consumption is the highest). And 
D 
Fω − ΠΔ
[ ]E i Eρ π− −  
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they are least costly debtors when debtors are the least ‘need’ of income (when the 
marginal utility of consumption is the lowest). On account of this undesirable 
property the supply price of bonds rises.10 
 
Figure 15: Inflation risk contracts the supply of bonds by worker speculators 
 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the combined impact of the shift inwards in the demand for 
bonds, and the shift upwards in the supply of bonds. 
                                                 
10 Inflation risk is bad for both capitalist creditors and worker debtors. Capitalist creditors 
seek a reduced opportunity cost in lending; that puts an upward pressure on the interest rate. 
Worker-debtors want a greater net gain from borrowing; that puts a downward pressure on the 
interest rate. 
[ ]E i Eρ π− −  
D 
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Figure 16: Bond market equilibrium under inflation risk 
 
Three observations can be made about the impact of inflation risk: 
 
First, the quantity of bonds unambiguously contracts. 
 
Second, the expected real interest rate on money bonds is unchanged. The lack of 
response is result of the mutual cancellation of two contrary forces. Inflation risk has 
deterred capitalist-creditors from lending; an effect which would, operating alone, 
drive up the rate. But inflation risk has also deterred worker-debtors from borrowing, 
an effect which would, alone, drive down the rate. The two effects cancel each other 
out, and the impact of inflation risk on the expected the real interest rate, and the 
premium on capital is zero.  
D 
Demand 
for bonds 
supply 
of bonds 
Fω−Π  
Gω−Π−  
F
ρω  
G
ρω
[ ]E i Eρ π− −  
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Thirdly, the magnitudes of Fρω  and Gρω  are driven apart. Consumption of the two 
interests is no longer synchronised in the face of technical shocks. There is a loss of 
welfare. 
 
Figures 12 and 13 can be adapted to bring out the social inefficiency of noisy 
inflation. Under our assumptions, welfare in the absence of risky inflation was the 
area lay between the demand curve that prevailed in the absence of risky inflation, 
and the supply curve that prevailed in the absence of risky inflation. The contraction 
in these demand and supply curves signals a loss in welfare.11 Welfare in the presence 
of noisy inflation is the contracted area underneath the demand curve, and above the 
supply curve, that prevail in the presence of noisy inflation; aa cc ee. A boomerang 
shaped area – aa ff ee cc – is the loss in consumer welfare.12 
 
                                                 
11  Marginal Expected Utility of a Unit of Capital 1[ [1 ]]
jE Uc ρ= +  
 Marginal Expected Utility of a Unit of Bonds 1
1[ ]
1
j iE Uc π
+= +  
So, 
Marginal Expected Utility of a Purchase of Bonds by way of a Sale of Capital 
= 1
1[ [ ] cov( , ) [1 ] cov( , ))]
1
j j jiE E E Ucπ υ ρ ρ υπ
+ + − − + −+  
 
1 1[ cov( , ) cov( , ) [ [1 ] [ ])]
1 1 cov( , )
j j
j
iE E
E
ρ υ π υ ρ π ρ ρ υ
+− + − − + − + + + ] 
So the downward shift in the demand curve is the loss of utility for bond buyers. Similarly for 
bond sellers. 
12 On an analogy with the welfare loss of tax on the demand and the supply of a good, it 
might be thought that the loss in welfare is the triangle bb dd ff. But the analogy does not 
hold. A tax on the demand and the supply of a good, yields revenue to the state (aa bb cc and 
ee cc dd) that the standard analysis assumes is used to provide tax relief. But in analysing the 
cost of unpredictable inflation there is no revenue. (It has been implicitly assumed here that 
any seigniorage is not used to annexe resources and so permit a reduction in taxes). 
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Figure 17: The impact of white noise inflation on welfare 
 
 
In algebraic terms it can be shown (Appendices 2 and 3) that, 
 the loss of welfare = 
~ ~
[ ] [ ]
2 2
F G F GD D
ρ ρω ω ω ω−Π −Π− = −     
 
 
To summarise: risky inflation reduces welfare by impeding the synchronisation of 
consumption across interests. In the absence of unpredictable inflation a money bonds 
market would be capable of perfectly synchronising consumption, but under white 
D D 
~
D  
aa 
bb
cc 
dd 
ee 
ff
[ ]E i Eρ π− −  
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noise inflation it cannot.13 That synchronisation of consumption that would take place 
at the old volume of lending is now disturbed by inflation surprises, which impact on 
the wealth of creditors and debtors in an unpredictable fashion. Discouraged from 
lending and borrowing, the amount of lending and borrowing shrinks. Capitalist-
creditors cannot obtain the security they want, and worker-debtors cannot obtain the 
return they want. 
 
Inflation risk without cost. 
The contention that risky inflation causes a welfare loss by discouraging the trade of 
risk must be qualified in several ways. 
 
First, the contention assumes that there is some beneficial trade in risk to be done. 
This will not be the case where technological shocks are such that all persons are 
equally exposed to risk. This will be the case if there is an equal distribution of capital 
so that there are no ‘workers’ and ‘capitalists’ but simply worker-capitalists. It will 
also be the case if technical progress is of the Hicks neutral technical variety. 
 
Secondly, the contention does rest on the assumption that inflation is white noise. If 
we suppose that inflation is not white noise but varies with complete predictablity 
with the rate of profit, then inflation risk will have no impact upon aggregate social 
welfare. Recall, 
 
                                                 
13 If lending stayed at 
~
D  then Fρω and Gρω would remain equal to each other. Despite this, 
consumption would not be synchronized. The equality of Fρω and Gρω  is a only necessary 
condition for synchronisation. It is not sufficient. The volatility imparted to real debts and 
credits by inflation shocks prevents synchronisation. 
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  1[1 ] [ ]
1
j jiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+  all j    
 
If there is perfect linear relation with the rate of profit    
 
     π γρ=       
 
 
then     j jργω ω−Π= −     14 
 
Therefore, 
   1[1 ] [ ] [1 ]
1
jiE E ρρ ω γπ
++ − = ++  all j   
   
 
The equality of the LHS for all j ensures jρω  is equal for all j.15 This is a signal that 
consumption is efficiently shared. 
   
                                                 
14 1 1 1cov( , ) [ ] [ ] cov( , )E E E Eρω ρ υ ρ ρ υ π π υ π υ ωγ γ γ −Π≡ − = − − = − − = − = −  
15 jω−Π  must be the same for all j, too. And this is puzzling. Should not the jω−Π s  differ 
across interests? Would not workers (as debtors) lose from a high growth in purchasing 
power, and capitalists (as creditors) win? And would that not create a negative correlation 
between marginal utility and -π for capitalists (as creditors), and a positive correlation for 
workers (as debtors)? No. This is because (by assumption) high and low inflation states are 
linked to profit states. So while the capitalist does gain from a high growth in purchasing 
power augmenting the real value of loans, that does not make for a negative correlation 
between marginal utility and -π , as a high growth in purchasing power state is also a low 
profit state. The conjunction of low profit and high purchasing power growth leave the 
marginal utility of the capitalist uncorrelated with purchasing power growth. A parallel logic 
applies to the worker debtor. 
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But this qualification of the original proposition is unlikely to be strong, for inflation 
is unlikely to be perfectly correlated with the profit rate. Rather inflation is likely to 
have one component that is related to the rate of profit, and a second that is unrelated 
white noise. 
 
     π γρ ε= +     
 
That part of inflation that is systematically related to profit has no social cost, but that 
which is white noise will be costly through discouragement of the trade in risk.  
 
The costs of inflation reconsidered 
 
Does the preceding theory of the cost of inflation change at all the appearance of the 
common account of the costs of inflation?  
 
‘this arbitrary rearrangement of riches’ 
 
The theory throws some light on the sentiment that it is the unpredictability in 
inflation, rather than its average level, that is harmful, as ‘choices’ are transformed 
into ‘gambles’.  
 
A more specific variant of this ‘unpredictability thesis’ – and one that is an old saw in 
the discussion of the costs of inflation – has it that that inflation is harmful on account 
of the unpredictable redistributions it secures between creditors and debtors. But how 
these redistributions are harmful to efficiency – as apart from equity - is barely 
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touched.16 The present analysis provides an answer. These unpredictable 
redistributions between creditors and debtors damage the welfare efficient by 
reducing the synchronisation of consumption across interests. Unpredictable 
redistributions reduce synchronisation directly and indirectly. Directly (through 
surprise inflations impact on the real value of credits and debts), and also indirectly by 
discouraging the transfer of risky capital from those with much to those with a little. 
 
Unpleasant Surprises  
 
The theory of the cost of inflation risk that has been advanced here is not only a cost 
in its own right, it is a cost that casts a shadow on some of supposed benefits of 
inflation. It puts a taint of those benefits. 
 
It puts a taint on the benefits of inflation unpredictability that have been argued to 
exisr. It has been argued that the merit of preserving smooth tax rates validates 
unpredictable seigniorage, and a concomitant unpredictable inflation, as seigniorage 
should fluctuate in accordance with unpredictable temporary shocks to government 
spending so as to allow tax rates to be invariant in the face of such shocks. In this 
                                                 
16  The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but 
 at the confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth. Those to 
 whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond 
 expectations and desires, become ‘profiteers’…As the inflation proceeds and the real 
 value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all  permanent relations 
 between debtors and creditors, who form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, 
 become so utterly disordered as to be utterly meaningless, and the process of 
 wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and lottery.  
  John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919.  
 
On a more analytical plane, the notion of inflation risk obstructing the effective 
intermediation between borrower and lender is briefly aired in the General Theory. In section 
iv of chapter 11 Keynes discusses the impact that an ‘adverse change in the monetary 
standard’ has on what he calls ‘lenders risk’ and ‘borrowers risk’. The upshot is a 
‘duplication’ of risk margins, ‘which has not hitherto been emphasised’. 
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logic a surprise increase in G should be financed by a (equally surprising) increase in 
S, relieving any need for taxes, and producing an a concomitant inflation surprise.  
 
Whatever benefit that seigniorage may have, it will, according to the theory of this 
chapter, be mingled with a cost; the cost of the disruption of capital markets. 
 
The argument for the cost of inflation risk is also an antidote to the recommendation 
of inflation risk that (we have seen) the theory of Shoe Leather costs implicitly makes 
in the presence of declining marginal shoe leather costs of inflation . 
 
Minimising Shoe Leather Cost 
 
The theory of the costs of unanticipated inflation also taints the benefits of deflation 
that is implied by the theory of Shoe Leather Costs. Recall that Shoe Leather Costs 
are minimised if, 
 
 π = −ρ 
 
The present theory is well prepared to analyse the impact of such a policy on capital 
markets. The Shoe Leather Cost minimising rule is a special case of, 
 
     π = γρ      
 
We have previously concluded that  γ =1 was no bar to efficient trade of risk. But 
1γ = − , or π = −ρ, is totally destructive of the risk shifting function of bond markets. 
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For if π = −ρ then money bonds have the same return as capital in all states. F cannot 
shift their consumption point by lending because in both states the payoff is the same 
(zero). The risk trading function of money bonds is destroyed. There is, therefore, a 
strict conflict between minimising shoe leather costs and maintaining the risk 
managing properties of the bond market. To strictly minimise shoe leather costs is to 
destroy the trade in risk. 
 
Quantifying the welfare loss of unpredictable inflation 
 
How large is the welfare loss from the reduction in the trade of risk caused by 
unpredictable inflation? Theory gives very little indication. It could as low as zero: it 
will be zero if, for example, F and G had the same endowment of capital and labour. 
And if it can be zero it can also be minute.  
 
Some help in quantifying its size can be derived from, 
 
  welfare cost = 
~ ~
[ ] [ ]
2 2
F G F GD D
ρ ρω ω ω ω−Π −Π− = −   
 
One could hazard numbers on the difference on risk premia and 
~
D , and draw the 
inference. So if we were willing to suppose the difference in risk premia is 0.01 (in 
decimals), and 
~
D  is twice C, then the cost of inflation risk is 0.01 of C, (or one 
percent). 
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A (perhaps) more reliable procedure would be to try to derive expressions for the risk 
premia, and then calibrate. These do not suggest the welfare loss from unpredictable 
inflation is large (Coleman 2007, pp238-9).   
 48
Appendix 1 
This appendix provides an argument for the invariance of the interest rate to white 
noise inflation. 
 
It is necessarily the case, 
 
cov( , )[1 ] cov( , ) cov( , )
F G
F G
C C C
EC EC EC
ρ λ ρ λ ρ− + =
 
 
and 
cov( , )[1 ] cov( , ) cov( , )
F G
F G
C C C
EC EC EC
π λ π λ π− − + − = −
 
 
where
GEC
EC
λ =
 
 
 
If 
cov( , )C
EC
ρ
and cov( , )Cπ− are unchanged by white noise inflation one may infer, 
 
cov( , )[1 ] cov( , ) 0 cov( , )[1 ] cov( , )
F G F G
F G F G
C C C C
EC EC EC EC
ρ λ ρ λ π λ π λΔ − + Δ = = Δ − − + Δ −
   
 
or 
 
cov( , )[1 ] cov( , )[1 ] cov( , ) cov( , )
F F G G
F F G G
C C C C
EC EC EC EC
ρ λ π λ ρ λ π λΔ − − Δ − − = −Δ + Δ −
 
 
But with homothetic and identical preferences 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1 [ 1][ 1]
F
F C
F
C
U C
EU EC
υ α− = − ≈ − −
 
or 
cov( , )cov( , )
1
j
jC ρ υρ α≈ −  
 
Thus 
 
[1 ][ cov( , ) cov( , )] [ cov( , ) cov( , )]F F G Gλ ρ υ π υ λ ρ υ π υ− Δ − Δ − = −Δ + Δ −  
 
Using 
11 [ ]
1
j jiE E ρρ ω ωπ −Π
++ − = −+ , this can be written as , 
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1 1[1 ] [1 [ ]] [1 [ ]]
1 1
i iE E E Eλ ρ λ ρπ π
+ +− − Δ + − = Δ + −+ +  
 
The only way to satisfy this is 
1[1 [ ]] 0
1
iE Eρ π
+Δ + − =+  
 
Appendix 2 
 
This appendix relates the algebraic and diagrammatic measures of the cost of 
inflation. 
 
The welfare loss is the sum of three triangles: aa bb cc; ee cc dd; and bb ff dd.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The welfare triangles analysis of the cost of unpredictable inflation 
 
bb ff dd =bb ff cc + cc ff dd =
bb gg ff cc
2 + 
cc ff hh dd
2 =
~
[ ][ ]
2
F G D Dω ω−Π −Π −−
  
aa bb cc = aa bb kk + kk bb cc = ii kk cc + kk bb cc = ii bb cc = 
ii bb cc jj
2 = 2
F Dω−Π
 
 
D D 
~
D  
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kk 
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  ee cc dd = 2
G Dω−Π−
 (by parallel logic) 
 
Welfare loss = aa bb cc + ee cc dd + bb dd ff = 
~ ~
[ ][ ] [ ]
2 2 2 2
F G F G F GD D D D Dω ω ω ω ω ω−Π −Π −Π −Π −Π −Π−− + − = −
 
 
Appendix 3 
This appendix derives measures of 
Fω−Π  etc. 
 
  cov( , ) [ ]
F F FE Eω υ π υ π π−Π ≡ − − = −  
 
  
[ 1][ ] ( )
F F
F
F
C EC E E
EC
ω α π π−Π −= − −
 
 
The proportionate deviation in C from expectation caused by a surprise inflation 
equals the propensity to consume out of wealth times times the loss of wealth. 
Assuming the propensity to consume is the interest rate, 
 
 
    
( )
F F
F F
C EC DrE E
EC EC
π π− = − −
 
 
Therefore, 
   
  
[1 ]varF F
Dr
C
ω α π−Π = −
  
and by the same logic, 
 
  
[1 ]varG G
Dr
C
ω α π−Π− = −
 
   
But   bb dd ff = 
~
0.5[ ][ ]F G D Dω ω−Π −Π+ −   
 
 = 
~
0.5[var [1 ] var [1 ]][ ]F G
D Dr r D D
C C
π α π α− + − −
 
 
 = 
~10.5[var [1 ] ][ ]
(1 )
Dr D D
C s s
π α− −−  
 
The area under the demand curve for bonds:  
 
  
2
0 0intercept - slope 2
DD=
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aa bb cc = the area between the old and the new demand curves, 
 
   
2
'
0 0intercept - slope 2
DD=
 
 
Therefore the area between the old and new demand curves is 
2
0 0-[slope slope '] 2
D= −
  
 
 
0 0
varslope slope ' [1 ]
F
F
r
D EC
ω π α−Π− = = −
    
 
Therefore  
 
aa bb cc = 
2var [1 ]F
r D
EC
π α−
=
2var 1[1 ]r D
C s
π α−
 
 
The area between the old and new supply curve, 
 
  
2
0 0-[slope slope '] 2
D= −
 
But 
 
  
0 0
varslope slope ' [1 ]
G
G
r
D EC
ω π α−Π− = = −
 
 
Therefore, 
ee cc dd =  
2var [1 ]
2G
r D
EC
π α−
=
2var 1[1 ]
2 1
r D
C s
π α− −  
 
Total cost = 
~
10.5[var [1 ] ]
(1 )
Dr D
C s s
π α− −  
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